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AN UNEASY PEACE: MULTILATERAL MILITARY
INTERVENTION IN CIVIL WARS
ELEANOR LUMSDEN*

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to
the peace
and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken .. to maintain or restore internationalpeace and
security. I
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations is under siege. Many international
lawyers assume that the theoretical principles embedded in
the United Nations Charter are either irrelevant or have outgrown their usefulness. In practice, states have repeatedly
demonstrated their willingness to intervene in the affairs of
other states. This practice has not abated despite the prohibition on the use of force contained in Article 2(4) of the U.N.
Charter. 2 Is this provision still good law, and does it still possess the power to bind states? Or, has the subsequent inconsistent practice of states altered its legal status? This Note argues
that while many of the principles contained within the Charter
are still crucial to our understanding of how international relations should be conducted, the international community must
be prepared to move beyond the strict confines of the law to
resolve the problems posed by intrastate conflict.
* Junior Fellow, Center for International Studies. A.B. 1998, Princeton
University; J.D. 2002, New York University School of Law. I would like to
thank Professor Thomas Franck for all of his steadfast support, guidance,
and advice. I am also indebted to Ambassador John Hirsch, Professor Edward Luck, Dr. Simon Chesterman, and Amb. David Malone at the International Peace Academy, Ambassador Sylvester Rowe, and Professor Jane
Stromseth for the time they were willing to spend answering my questions. I
would also like to thank Mr. Radu Popa for his invaluable research assistance
and Ms. Shelley Fenchel for her support. Special thanks to my family.
1. U.N. CHARTFR art. 39.
2. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4 ("All members shall refrain in their in-

ternational relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.").
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Civil wars deserve special attention because the proliferation of intrastate conflict has profound implications for the
stability of the international system.3 A discussion of the
problems raised by intrastate conflict is a critical first step in
structuring the future practice of states, regional organizations, and other international bodies as they attempt to utilize
prevention and nation-building strategies in the search for
peace. Hence the need for the United Nations-for principles
that focus on multilateral cooperation, as well as for actors
who realize that the successful resolution of complex humanitarian crises may require more than a military response.
Yet the principles in the United Nations Charter regarding the use of force are sufficiently indeterminate as to require
an examination of state practice. Furthermore, state practice,
as examined through case studies of multilateral interventions,
shows significant inroads in the limitations against the use of
force. This is particularly evident where regional or multilateral actors are involved. In general, the international community has not resisted these changes. Does this mean that the
traditional rule of non-intervention has become a dead letter?
This article will examine seven instances in which a group
of states or regional organizations have intervened with military force in an ongoing civil war either because their interests
were directly threatened or in order to avert grave humanitarian consequences. Parts I and II will define and explore the
various permutations of multilateral and regional intervention. Part III will summarize the legal justifications advanced
in favor of or against multilateral military intervention. Part IV
will examine, through the use of country case studies, interventions where states either deviated from or ignored completely Article 2(4)'s prohibition against the use of force without prior Security Council authorization. The article will address the interventions by: (1) Belgium and the United States
in the Democratic Republic of Congo (D.R.C.) in 1964; (2)
the U.S. and Organization of American States (OAS) in the
3.

INT'L COMM'N

ON INTERVENTION AND STATE

SOVEREIGNTY, THE RE-

SPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 5 (2001) [hereinafter THE RESPONSIBILIrY TO PROTECT] ("Intra-state warfare is often viewed, in the prosperous West, simply as

a set of discrete and unrelated crises occurring in distant and unimportant
regions. In reality, what is happening is a convulsive process of state fragmentation and state formation that is transforming the international order
itself.").
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Dominican Republic in 1965; (3) France and Belgium in Zaire
in 1978; (4) the United States and the Economic Community
of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia in 1990; (5) the U.S. and Allied Forces in Iraq in 1991; (6)
ECOMOG in Sierra Leone in 1997; and (7) NATO in Kosovo
in 1998. In conclusion, this article will show that despite slight
deviations from the old formulas, the Security Council has
proven that it is flexible to new understandings of the function
and purpose of international law.
II.

MULTILATERAL AND REGIONAl. ACTIONS

Under the Charter,the Security Council has and will continue to
have primary responsibility for maintaining internationalpeace and
security, but regional action as a matter of decentralization,delegation
and cooperation with the United Nations efforts could not only lighten
the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense ofparticipation, consensus and democratization in internationalaffairs .... 4
One might address the topic of multilateral intervention
from a number of different standpoints. However, in order to
narrow the potentially limitless scope of the subject, in this
Note "multilateral" intervention will refer to actions taken by
two or more states, either acting in concert or loosely associated, as well as actions by regional organizations. Various regional organizations, such as the Organization of African
Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), and the Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States (OECS) have gained a substantial measure of legitimacy
and have managed to influence decisions not only within their
regions but in the United Nations and the broader international community as well.
Chapter VIII of the Charter sets out the parameters for
actions taken by regional organizations. 5 Article 53(1) pro4. An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, Report of the Secretary General, U.N. GAOR/SCOR, 47th Sess., Preliminary

List Item 10,

64, U.N. Docs. A/47/277 & S/24111 (1992) [hereinafter An

Agenda for Peace].

5. "Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional
arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional
action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are
consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations." U.N.
CHARTER art. 52, para. 1.
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vides an important check on regional decision-making: "But
no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the
Security Council .... 6 The two exceptions to this rule are (1)
in the case of "enemy states," 7 defined as states who were enemies of any signatories of the Charter during World War II;8 or
(2) "regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of [an enemy] state." 9 Outside of these
exceptions, however, the Charter imposes clear limits on the
scope of regional organizations' activities.
III.

LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS ADVANCED FOR
MULTIIATERAL. INTERVENTION

A.

Military Intervention

The term "intervention" may refer to a number of different situations. It may, for example, include either: (1) the
training and support of revolutionary forces; or (2) the sale of
arms to either side of an external conflict.' However, because
including the sale of arms and war material would expand the
scope of this paper to conflict situations that are not strictly
civil wars, multilateral military intervention will refer to the active participation in fighting or direct military assistance given
by the national forces of several states or regional organizations, acting in conjunction with each other, in the internal
conflicts of another state. "Internal conflicts" may include ethnic strife, the overthrow of an established government, the absence of law and order, the unconstitutional seizure of power
in a U.N. member state, or general violence existing within the
boundaries of a state.I'
In the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice
stated that the mere supply of funds (by the U.S.) to the Con6.
7.
8.
9.

Id. art. 53, para. 1.
Id.
Id. art. 53, para. 2.
Id. art. 53, para. 1.

10. DAVID EVAN TRANT LUARD, CONFLIF AND PEACE IN THE MODERN IN-

TERNA1IONAL SYSTEM 121 (2d ed., Macmillan Press 1988) (1968).

11. Lori Fisler Damrosch, Introduction, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 1, 4-5 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed.,

1993).
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tras did not constitute an illegal use of force. 2 In many of the
case studies found below, insurgents involved in civil strife received indirect assistance in the form of arms, funds, or machinery. Since inclusion of any situation in which outside assistance is supplied to fuel strife would unreasonably expand the
scope of the paper and distract from the focus on intrastate
conflict, this article will be limited to a discussion of interventions where troops have been purposely contributed to effect a
change in the status quo in the internal affairs of another
state. Peacekeeping or non-enforcement mechanisms will necessarily be excluded because while they may involve the use of
military force, they are not intended to bring about a change
in the status quo.
Furthermore, because there are too many situations in
which the presence of outside participants blurs the line between intrastate and interstate conflict, this article will address
only civil wars that "originate within the borders of a country
and largely remain isolated as such.""' According to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, civil wars are:
Conflicts . . . which take place in the High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident
armed forces or other organized armed groups
which, under responsible command, exercise such
control over a part of its territory as to enable them
to carry out sustained and concerted military opera4
tions and to implement this protocol.'
In modern civil wars there are often more than two opposing factions that are struggling for control of a state's government. Since this paper is not concerned with situations
that may be labeled as mere uprisings, the important factor for
the following examination is that the legitimate government is
unable to exercise full control over its citizens because there is
a serious division of thought, military might, and power.

228

12. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,
une 27) [hereinafter Military and Paramilitary Activities].

13. PATRICK M. REGAN, CIVIL WARS AND FOREIGN POWERS: OUTSIDE INTERVENTION IN INTRASTATE CONFLIC.r 6 (2000).

14. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Con-

flicts (Protocol II), adoptedJune 8, 1977, art. 1, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609, 611 (entered into force Dec. 12, 1978).
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Legal Justifications

The general prohibition on the use of force applies to
states as well as regional organizations. In Chapter VII of the
Charter, Article 39 expressly states that the Security Council,
and not individual states, will determine whether there has
been a threat to the peace; when a threat has been established,
the Security Council shall take measures to maintain or restore
international peace and security. 1 5 Many states have chosen to
justify their actions by reference to the loophole provided by
Article 51 and invoke the right of collective self-defense which
is triggered by invitation of the victim state.' 6 In the absence
of a self-defense rationale, the practice of states suggests that
multilateral interventions, unlike unilateral ones, still fall
within the spirit of the current Charter rules.
Alternatively, states have advanced humanitarian excuses
or the threat posed by regional instability as legitimate justifications for intervention. One of the stated purposes expressed
in the Charter is that of solving international problems "of an
economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, and promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms ...... 17 This language might be read in
conjunction with Article 2(4)18 as conveying a broad right of
intervention where fundamental human rights violations have
occurred. Tes6n states: "Considerable authority [exists] for
the proposition that the right of humanitarian intervention
was a rule of customary law prior to the adoption of the UN
Charter." 19 This is still a minority view among the member
states of the U.N. 20 More importantly, there is no way of get15. U.N. CHARTER art. 39. See supra note I and accompanying text for
the text of Article 39.
16. Id. art. 51 ("Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.") For examples of states justifying their actions by invoking the right to collective selfdefense, see infra Part IV.
17. Id. art. 1, para. 3 (regarding purpose of achieving international cooperation).
18. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4, supra note 2.
19. FERNANDO R. TES6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 175 (2d ed. 1997).

20. Cf Alex de Waal & Rakiya Omaar, Can Military Intervention Be "Humanitarian"?,MIDDLE E. REP., Mar.-June 1994, at 4-5 (noting that the U.N.

Charter was "drawn up in the context of extreme skepticism about 'humani-
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ting around the fact that the Charter requires that states and
regional organizations seek Security Council authorization
priorto intervening in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. 2'
One of the challenges of this paper is to analyze state practice
to the contrary in order to determine if the traditional rule of
non-intervention has any capacity to bind states or whether it
has become a dead letter.
IV.

CASE STUDIES

Intrastate violence, driven by regional and ethnic tensions, is increasingly common in the aftermath of World War
II and decolonization. 2 2 Developing nations demand that
world powers respect their autonomy and allow them to devise
their own solutions to wars raging within their territories. Yet
many states find that their inability to contain intrastate conflict exacerbates the depletion of valuable resources and compromises their position in the global community. This resource drain affects not only the countries in which the civil
wars occur, but also the states that will eventually be forced to
23
intervene.
First, the Note will describe the legal framework within
which the intervention in question occurred, as well as the relevant events that preceded and influenced the outcome of
each of the military interventions. Second, the Note will attempt to address questions regarding the interventions, such
as: What went right or wrong? How is success or failure determined? Is it even possible to assess an intervention in terms of
success or failure? How did various U.N. organs respond to the
interventions? The case studies will be used to illustrate lessons that the international community should have learned
tarian'justifications for intervention" and the post-1950s refusal of the international community to accept invocations of the principle to justify intervention).

21. See U.N. CHARTER art. 53, para. 1, supra note 6 and accompanying

text.
22.

PATRICK

M.

REGAN, CIVIL WARS AND FOREIGN POWERS: OUTSIDE INTER-

VENTION IN INTRASTATE CONFLICT 27-28 (2000).

23. See, e.g., Babafemi Akinrinade, InternationalHumanitarianLaw and the
Conflict in Sierra Leone, 15 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'v 391, 437
(2001) (noting that countries that contributed to the intervention in Sierra
Leone, infra Section IV.B.3, encouraged peace negotiations in part because
of the cost of the operations).
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from the interventions. Finally, this section will address the
role that regional organizations might play in alleviating intrastate conflict in the event that the Security Council is either
unwilling or unable to respond to global crises.
The traditional rule of non-intervention is:
All members shall refrain in their international relaLions from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the pur24
poses of the United Nations.
Yet state jurisprudence is full of cases in which states have
freely ignored the principle of non-intervention. If a civil war
has progressed beyond that of a purely internal matter and has
evolved into a war where outside forces are involved in the
conflict, according to customary international law, the victim
25
state then has the right to enlist other states to provide aid.
Intervention may be lawful if an invitation is extended to either (a) deal with limited internal unrest not rising to the level
of civil war; or (b) aid the requesting government in responding to prior interventions carried out in its territory by states or
other entities. 2 6 These criteria will be used to examine the following case studies to determine whether the right of self-defense has been invoked properly or whether other principles
found in the U.N. Charter may be relevant.
A.
1.

Interventions in Defense of Nationals

The Belgian and U.S. Intervention in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo

Despite the apparent leadership of Prime Minister Moise
Tshombe, by 1964 a third of the Congo was controlled by a
rebel group led by Christopher Gbenye called the Conseil National de Liberation (CNL).2 7 In early September, Gbenye,
24. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4; see also Military and Paramilitary Activities, supra note 12
188.
25. CHRISTINE D. GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 57-58
(2000).
26. Id.
27. See CONGO (LUopoldville). -End of FirstParliamentand of Adoula Governmen.-M. Tshombe forms Interim "Government of Reconciliation., " 10 KEESING'S

CoNTE10P. ARCHIVES 20,217, 20,217-18 (Aug. 8-15,
TERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE? 66-67 (2001).

1964);

SIMON CHES-
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with aid from the United Arab Republic (UAR), Algeria,
Ghana, the Sudan, and Kenya, captured Stanleyville and proclaimed himself President of a Provisional Revolutionary Government. 28 On September 26, the CNL took more than a
thousand foreign nationals hostage in Stanleyville and
threatened to kill them unless the government agreed to certain concessions.2' - Over the next several months, all peaceful
overtures made by the U.N., the OAU, the International Red
Cross, and individual African heads of state to secure the release of the hostages were unsuccessful. -"
In light of the deteriorating military situation and success
of the rebel forces, on November 21, 1964, Prime Minister
Tshombe invited the American government to provide assistance. 1 On December 18, he visited Belgium to appeal for
further assistance.32 Tshombe had authorized the Belgian
government to send a rescue force to evacuate the foreign citizens being held as hostages by the rebels."" Belgium was reportedly reluctant initially to increase "technical aid"3 4 above
what it had already been supplying to the Congo. Nevertheless, Belgium and the United States (using military facilities
belonging to Great Britain) began a controversial, massive military operation which led to the airdrop of Belgian paratroopers into Stanleyville. Within days, Belgium and the U.S. recaptured Stanleyville from the rebels and secured the release of
1800 European and 300 Congolese hostages. Besides freeing
the hostages, the invasion helped the government troops to
28. MARK A. WEISBURD, USE OF FORCE: THE PRA(FICE OF S[ATES SINCE

II 266 (1997).
suflra note 27, at 67.
WEISBURD, supra note 28, at 266.

WORLD WAR

29.
30.

CHESTERAN,

31. Id.
32. CONGO (Leopoldville).-M. Tshombe's Visits to Europe.-Ending of Companies' Rights to Grant Mining Concessions., 11 KEESING;'S CONTEMP. ARCHIIES

20,613, 20,613 (Feb. 27-Mar. 6, 1965) [hereinafter M. Tshonbe's Visits to Europe]
33. CONGO (Leopoldville).-Belgian-U.S. Air Operation at Stanleyville and

Paulisto Rescue While Hostages Held by Rebels., 11 KEESING'S CONTEMP. ARCHIVES
20,561, 20,561 (Feb 6-13, 1965) [hereinafter Belgian-U.S. Air Operation at
Stanleyville and Paulis].
34. M. Tshombe's Visits to Europe, supra note 32, at 20,613 ("including the

services of 370 Belgian officers and N.C.O.s as advisors to the Congolese
National Army").
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solidify their positions against the rebels in other areas in the
35
Congo.
On December 1, 1964, President Kasavubu labeled the
humanitarian mission a success. International reaction to the
operation was sharply divided, however, with international responses ranging from "outright condemnation in Moscow, Peking, Belgrade, and many African capitals to qualified acceptance in a number of other African capitals and approval in
Western countries."3 6 President Ben Bella of Algeria, Prime
Minister Aklilou Habte Wold of Ethiopia, President Nkrumah
of Ghana, Mr. Kenyatta of Kenya, President Nyerere of
Tanzania, and the government of Tunisia condemned the operation. In addition, the OAU Conciliation Commission met
between November 27-28, 1964, and adopted a resolution
strongly condemning Britain, Belgium and the U.S. for their
involvement in the affairs of the Congo. On December 18, the
OAU adopted a resolution (20 in favor, 0 against, with 10 abstentions) officially condemning the intervention. 37 The
members of the organization felt the intervention was overly
hasty and should not have occurred without the consultation
of other regional actors in Africa.
The intervention was initially brought to the attention of
the Security Council by Afghanistan, Algeria, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Sudan, the UAR, and 15 sub-Saharan African States,
all of whom characterized the U.S. and Belgian operation as a
flagrant violation of the U.N. Charter. These states, while
targeting Belgium and the U.S., also claimed that Algeria, the
Sudan, Ghana, the UAR, the People's Republic of China
(P.R.C.), and the Soviet Union were illegally intervening in the
Congolese conflict. - 8 The Security Council debated a resolution recommending and requesting that all states refrain from
intervening in the domestic affairs of the Congo. 39 The
twenty-two states attacking the operation denied the legitimacy
of the Tshombe government, claimed that the invitation ex35.

WEISBURD, supra note 28, at 266.
36. Belgian-U.S. Air Operation at Stanleyville and Paulis, supra note 33, at

20,562. African countries not opposing the intervention included Nigeria,
Sierra Leone, Togo, and Madagascar. Id. at 20,563.
37. Id. at 20,566.
38. WEISBURD, supra note 28, at 267.
39. Interview with Edward Luck, Director, Columbia Center on International Organization, in New York, N.Y. (Mar. 1, 2002).
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tended by it was invalid, and claimed that the intervention was
no mere rescue operation, but a calculated plot to further the
intervening states' ideological interests in the conflict. This
position was supported in the Council by the Soviet Union and
4
Czechoslovakia. 0
On the other side of the debate, the Belgian, British and
U.S. governments all strenuously persisted in their claim that
the operation was a rescue operation whose sole purpose was
to avert humanitarian catastrophe. 4 1 In particular, the U.S.
advanced three main justifications for its actions: (1) it acted
on the basis of a legitimate invitation from the Congolese government; (2) the response conformed with the requirements
in the 1949 Geneva Conventions; and (3) the U.S. needed to
act to protect its own nationals, as well as the Congolese citizens who were threatened by the conflict. 42 France, Brazil, the
Republic of Congo (R.O.C.), Bolivia, and Norway all supported the U.S. position, stressing the validity of the invitation
by the Congolese government. 43 Nigeria stated that it believed
the invitation was valid and the operation was clearly within
the limits imposed by international law. 44 While expressing
sympathy with the humanitarian need for intervention, Morocco reaffirmed the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states. 45 Finally, the Central African Republic
and Ivory Coast deplored the invasion by the paratroopers but
4
acknowledged the legitimacy of the Tshombe government. "
40. WEISBURD,

41.

supra note 28, at 267.

United States Cooperates with Belgium in Rescue of Hostages from the Congo,
51 DEP'T ST. BULL. 838, 846 (1964) (claiming U.S. intervention was "for
purely humanitarian reasons and with the authorization of the Government
of the Congo"); see also Letter Dated 24 November 1964 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America Addressed to the President of the Security
Council, U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess., Supp. for Oct.-Dec. 1964, at 187, U.N. Doc.
S/6062 (1964) ("The sole purpose ... was to liberate hostages whose lives
were in danger."); Letter Dated 24 November from the Permanent Representative of
Belgium Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess.,
Supp. for Oct.-Dec. 1964, at 190, U.N. Doc. S/6063 (1964) (Belgium was
"forced to take this action in accordance with the rules of international law
codified by the Geneva Conventions.")
42. United States Cooperates with Belgium in Rescue of Hostagesfrom the Congo,
supra note 41, at 841.
43. WEISBURD, supra note 28, at 267.
44. Security Council, 19 INT'L ORG., 331, 347 (1965).
45. Id. at 349.
46. WEISBURD, supra note 28, at 267.
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In response to the crisis, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 226. 4 7 The resolution called upon all states to "refrain or desist" from any intervention in the domestic affairs of
the D.R.C., agree to a cease-fire, and refrain from using mercenaries. The resolution was adopted 10-0, with France abstaining.4 Despite the relatively clear wording, both member
and non-member states disagreed over the intended targets of
the resolution-some felt that the resolution was targeted at
China and the U.S.S.R., while others believed the resolution
4meant that Belgium and the United States should desist. 9
Notwithstanding assertions that the humanitarian justification
was a pretext for other political agendas, the Council chose
not to condemn explicitly either the United States or Belgium
for the intervention.
Nonetheless, many African countries expressed their general feelings of unease about the intervention. An unidentified African diplomat, quoted by the international press,
stated:
[W]e had hoped that independence, U.N. membership, a flag, a Government, a President of the Republic, Ministers, and a small national Army would all
give us a human dignity we had not known for centuries .... But at Stanleyville. . . [w] e were shown that
we were not really masters in our own house.50
Charges of racism had also been raised during the conflict:5 ' Some commentators were concerned that Western
52
powers seemed willing to sacrifice the lives of Black Africans
for those of a comparatively small number of White foreigners,
47. S.C. Res. 226, U.N. SCOR, 21st Sess., 1306th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
226 (1966) (adopted unanimously).
48. Id.; see also 1964 U.N.Y.B. 99, U.N. Sales No. 65.1.1.
49. 1964 U.N.Y.B., supra note 48, at 100.
50. Belgian-U.S. Air Operation at Stanleyville and Paulis, supra note 33, at
20,563.
51. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 19th Sess., ll70th mtg. at 83-85, U.N. Doc. S/
PV.1170 (1964).
52. Thomas M. Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of
Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 288-89
(1973). Although 300 Congolese were reportedly saved by the operation,
the Congolese military, aided by the Americans and Belgians, proceeded to

inflict serious casualties on the rebel forces.
266-67.

WFISBURD,

supra note 28, at
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in a country not far removed from its colonial past.5 3 In addition, many African countries questioned whether Prime Minister Tshombe had actual authority to issue a request for help to
5 4
areas over which he exercised de facto control.
Despite the debate surrounding the legality of the Belgian
and U.S. airdrop, neither state was officially sanctioned for its
intervention. On the one hand, the Belgian airdrop could be
characterized as a simple rescue operation: The United States
and Belgium, with an official invitation by the host state, entered the Congo briefly, ensured the release of approximately
2,000 foreign and citizen hostages, and promptly left the country. On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that,
whether purposeful or not, the Belgian and U.S. operation
changed the status quo in the Congo. The intervention was
instrumental in bolstering the supremacy of the Tshombe government, which until that time faced a credible threat from
Gbenye and the CNL.
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter states that nothing "shall
impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the
United Nations. '5 5 If the invitation was legitimate, the U.S.
and Belgian intervention was legal; the question is whether the
right of invitation vested in P.M. Tshombe or in Gbenye, who
had been announced President of the newly proclaimed Provisional Revolutionary Government. While the U.S. and
Belgium took up the former as bearer of the right, depending
on the amount of territory captured by the rebels, this was an
arguable assumption of fact. Regardless of who was in fact winning the war at the time of the intervention, it is perhaps
doubtful that it would have been carried out at all if a significant number of foreign hostages had not been involved. The
lack of Security Council condemnation on the matter may vell
have been a tacit acknowledgment of this fact.
53. Belgian-U.S. Air Operation at Stanlevville and Paulis, supra note 33, at

20,563

("Admittedly a few hundred Whites were in danger. But at

Sharpeville the Pretoria Government murdered 400 Blacks at one blow, and

no country dropped parachutists. In Angola tens of thousands of Africans
have been killed, and nobody makes a move.").
54. ANTONIO TANc(A,
FLICT 158 (1993).

55. U.N.

FOREIGN

CHARTER, art.

ARMED

INTERVENTION

IN INTERNAL

CON-

51.
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In any event, opinion in the international community was
also divided over whether the humanitarian justification was
mere pretext for other political objectives. Even if true, this
contention is belied by the length of the intervention. While
many have argued that the massive air drop of foreign troops
altered the territorial integrity and domestic affairs of the
D.R.C., the fact that the troops were withdrawn within four
days adds much legitimacy to the U.S. and Belgian claims that
they acted solely to rescue the hostages.
2.

56
The U.S. and OAS Intervention in the Dominican Republic

In September 1963, President Juan Bosch of the Dominican Republic (D.R.) was ousted in a coup. Between 1963 and
1964, various groups attempted to overthrow the new government.5 7 On April 24, 1965, additional fighting erupted when a
coalition of citizens and military personnel attempted to return Bosch to power. 58 After a confusing series of events, the
coalition arrested the chief of staff, then had a local civilian
radio station report that the current regime had been overthrown with members of the Bosch regime being restored to
power. This report was widely believed. 59 Consequently, a faction of the military opposed to Bosch's return responded with
air attacks on the presidential palace and attacked civilians
known to support Bosch. The pro-Bosch forces, transformed
into a military junta, were unsuccessful in their attempts to
regain control and were forced to occupy areas just outside of
the city.60
The American embassy, reportedly fearing for the safety
of its citizens, recommended that the United States dispatch
troops to the D.R. 6 1 U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson told
the American public that the troops were being sent in to pro56. For a relevant discussion on the initial unilateral action taken by the

United States, see Christopher LeMon, Unilateral Intervention by Invitation in
Civil Wars: The Effective Control Test Tested, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 741,

762 (2003).
57. ABRAHAM F.

LOWENTHAL, THE DOMINICAN INTERVENTION 35 (1972);
WILLIAM BLUM, KILLING HOPE: U.S. MILITARY AND CIA INTERVENTIONS SINCE
WORLD WAR 11 180 (Common Courage Press 1995) (1986).
58. LOWENTHAL, supra note 57, at 61; BLUM, supra note 57, at 180-81.
59. LOWENTHAL, supra note 57, at 61.

60. Id. at 76-77, 96.
61. See BRUCE PALMER,

JR., INTERVENTION IN THE CARIBBEAN

4-5

(1989).

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

2003l

AN UNEASY PEACE

tect the lives of U.S. citizens and "to prevent the D.R. from
becoming 'a second Cuba.' ''62 Within ten days of an initial
deployment of 500 Marines, a larger force comprising 23,000
U.S. troops arrived in the D.R. Apparently, the mission of
these forces, according to their commander, was to prevent a
Communist takeover of the D.R.63 Upon arrival, U.S. troops
confined the pro-Bosch rebels in a small downtown area of
Santo Domingo. At times, the pro-Bosch forces appeared to
gain ground, but the U.S. maintained its non-combative stance
while attempts were made to resolve the situation through dip64
lomatic means in the OAS.

Whereas the initial U.S. intervention in the Dominican
Republic was unilateral, on May 6, 1965, the OAS passed a resolution which authorized the establishment of an Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) to include troops from six Latin American states. 65 By May 29, 1965, the troops from Brazil, Costa
Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Paraguay had arrived in the Dominican Republic, the American forces were
absorbed into the IAPF, and the U.S. ceased all unilateral action. By June 2, all of the decision-making ability regarding
the situation in the D.R. had been turned over to an ad-hoc
committee established by the OAS's Foreign Ministers. Between June and September, this committee established a provisional government in the D.R., monitored free elections, and
ensured that all remaining IAPF forces were withdrawn
quickly.
Most third-states denounced the intervention while affirming the Article 2(4) principle of non-intervention?3 Statements made in the General Assembly denounced the unilateral action by the U.S. 6 7 The Security Council adopted resolu-

tions calling for a ceasefire. 68

Only the United Kingdom

62. Joseph B. Treaster, Twefnty Years Afler Dominican Wa,

N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1985, at A2.
63. See PALMER, supra note 61, at 4-6.

Wounds Li nge;

64. BLUM, supra note 57, at 181-84.
65. CHESTERMAN, supra note 27, at 70-71.
66. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4, supra note 2.
67. See, e.g., U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 1335th mtg.
57-60, U.N. Doc. A/
PV.1335 (1965) (Soviet Union); U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess., 1340th mtg.
29,
36-37, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1340 (1965) (Ecuador).
68. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 203, U.N. SCOR, 20th Sess., 1208th mtg., U.N. Doc
No. S/RES/203 (1965); S.C. Res. 205, U.N. SCOR, 20th Sess., 1217th mtg.,
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expressed full support for the intervention. 69 In addition,
many members of the OAS criticized the United States and
made clear that they had not wanted to be drawn into the conflict: "OAS established the IAPF by a bare 2/3 majority vote,
including the vote of the junta's representative which was of
highly questionable validity .... It did not receive the support
7
of most of the democratic members of the organization." 0
Despite the criticism, the OAS did join the U.S. in the intervention and called on other states to assist in the mission as
well. In the end, the Security Council chose not to adopt a
potential resolution condemning the intervention-six out of
eleven members of the Security Council voted against it while
7
four abstained. '
While the change in the government in the Dominican
Republic did lead to general instability and civil conflict, it is
debatable whether a threat to international peace and security
actually existed. Although the Johnson Administration first
claimed that the intervention was primarily intended to protect U.S. nationals and other foreigners,7 2 this position was
soon abandoned. Interviews of native Dominicans (albeit
twenty years after the events) suggest that many felt the danger
to the several hundred U.S. citizens in the capital was minimal
and that the "smattering of virtually leaderless Dominican
Communists posed no serious threat to anyone." 73 Similarly,
the New York Times reported that: "Unlike the Grenadians,
[the Dominicans] are not overwhelmingly grateful for the
American intervention." 74 Taken together, these statements
suggest that the originally articulated justification for the U.S.
intervention in the D.R. was a mere pretext for U.S. concern
over the maintenance of its sphere of influence.
Yet the fact remains that enough members of OAS voted
to support the intervention; standing alone, the decision to reU.N. Doc. No. S/RES/205 (1965); see generally 1965 U.N.Y.B. 140-52, U.N.
Sales No. 66.1.1 (summarizing the Security Council's activity regarding the
situation in the Dominican Republic).
69. 1965 U.N.Y.B., supra note 68, at 142.
70. James P. Rowles, The United States, the OAS, and the Dilemma of the Undesirable Regime, 13 (Supp.) GA. J. INr'L & CoMp. L. 385, 401 (1983).
71. See 1965 U.N.Y.B., supra note 68, at 147.
72. CHESTERMAN, supra note 27, at 70.
73. Treaster, supra note 62, at A2.
74. Id.
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inforce the U.S. added a measure of legitimacy to the mission.
Thus, the intervention, widely condemned when it was still
characterized as a unilateral undertaking, gained more support after being transformed into a multilateral operation.
Had the U.S. not attempted to synchronize its efforts with that
of a regional organization, the debates over the legality of the
intervention in the Security Council likely may have led to a
more strongly-worded resolution.
3.

The French and Belgian Intervention in Zaire

In May 1978, rebels associated with the Front Nationale
de la Liberation du Congo (FLNC) entered Zaire from neighboring Angola and Zambia and gained control of the coppermining center of Kolwezi. Within ten days of the takeover, the
rebel troops had murdered 200 resident foreigners. 75 President Mobutu and the Zairean foreign minister immediately requested assistance from France, Belgium, the United States,
and China. France and Belgium provided the main supply of
troops in the operation and the U.S. provided logistical support.76

French troops arrived on May 19th, and Belgian troops
followed on the 20th; within a day the multilateral forces were
able to regain control of Kolwezi and evacuate the majority of
the hostages. 77 The outside forces then immediately implemented phased withdrawals from Zaire. Belgium withdrew on
May 22nd, and France followed suit on the 25th. On June 4th,
Moroccan troops arrived (via planes provided by the United
States) and replaced the departing Belgian and French troops.
Several other states also participated in the intervention: Angola agreed to help disarm the FNLC, and Egypt, Senegal, Sudan, Ivory Coast, Togo, and Gabon agreed to send 78troops to
fill the void left by the departure of the Europeans.
The French and Belgian governments gave two different
reasons for their intervention. According to the French presi75. TANCA, supra note 54, at 170.
76. Id. at 171.
77. However, in contrast to the Belgian forces who assisted solely in the
rescue operation, French forces actively assisted the government of Zaire in
restoring law and order in the province. See ZAIRE-Second Invasion of Shaba
Province by Rebels-Harassment and Murder of Europeans, 24 KEESING'S CONTEMP. ARCHr ES,

29,125, 29,125-31 (Aug. 11, 1978).

78. See id. at 29,127, 29,130.
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dent, troops were sent in at the invitation of Zaire with the aim
of "protecting the French and foreign residents of Kolwezi and
re-establishing security there. '79 In contrast, the Belgian
Prime Minister L~o Tindemans stated that "the French operation is quite different in character from the Belgian operation," whose purpose was to "bring help to the European and
local population."8 0 Both countries also articulated a number
of other reasons, including: (1) the receipt of an invitation
from the legitimate government of Zaire, conducted within
the strict confines of international law; (2) the participation in
only actions taken on a defensive basis to guarantee security;
(3) the fulfillment of a contractual obligation with a friendly
country (referring to a treaty that had been negotiated but not
yet passed); (4) the consent of the Zairean government; and
(5) the request of Zairean government for logistical support
(from the United States). 8'
The intervening states had strategic interests, beyond the
rescue of their nationals, implicated if Zaire fell to the rebels.
For example, the United States wished to improve its relations
with Zaire; 8 2 France and Belgium both had strong economic
interests in the region;
and Morocco and Egypt reportedly
84
feared the implications of Communist activity in Africa.
The 1978 intervention in Zaire was not addressed by any
U.N. organ. 85 U.N. silence, viewed in conjunction with the significant troop contributions from multilateral actors, might indicate general acceptance of the intervention. Yet some members of the international community did object to the intervention. The Soviet Union strongly opposed it and stated that the
defense of protecting one's nationals was not a valid justification. While agreeing that Zaire had the right to invoke the
right of collective self-defense, President Nyerere of Tanzania
79. See id. at 29,126.
80. Id. (emphasis added).
81. TANCA, supra note 54, at 171.
82. Stephen R. Weissman, CIA Covert Action in Zaire and Angola: Patterns
and Consequences, 94 POL. Sci. Q. 263, 274 (1979).
83. Michael G. Schatzberg, Military Intervention and the Myth of Collective
Security: The Case of Zaire, 27J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 315, 332-33 (1989).
84. See id. at 332. Cf Olajide Aluko, African Response to External Intervention in African since Angola, 80 AFR. AFF. 159, 168-69 (1981) (noting Morocco
and Egypt's support for Mobutu in the 1978 intervention).
85. WEISBURD, supra note 28, at 278.
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felt that military aid should not be used to further the purposes of a corrupt government, especially at the expense of
the citizens who did not support the government. In a meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers, Mozambique and Nigeria also criticized the operation-Nigeria denounced what it
termed "gunboat diplomacy and neocolonialism." The OAU
Assembly decried Zaire's signing of military pacts with non-Af6
rican countries.8
Overall however, the reaction of the international community to the French and Belgian intervention was muted.
The criticisms that did surface were significantly less strident
than those regarding the intervention by the U.S. and Belgium
in the Congo in 1964, or the 1963 intervention in the Dominican Republic.
4.

8
Lessons Learned

7

One of the major conclusions of this paper is that multilateral interventions are preferable to unilateral operations because the broad-based participation lends a measure of legitimacy that is lacking when states act alone. Since disagreement
exists as to whether the U.S. and OAS intervention in the Dominican Republic can be truly labeled "multilateral," the question of what it means for an intervention to be classified as
such would seem a basic first step in assessing the legitimacy of
the intervention. A number of questions arise: (a) Do participating states have to contribute the same number of troops?;
(b) What if one state significantly dominates the intervention?;
and (c) What if one state contributes troops but another simply lends "logistical" or "technical" aid in the form of transport, training, or supervision? Do these kinds of doubts detract from the classification of an intervention as a multilateral
undertaking? Or is it enough simply to have a "meeting of the
minds"-an agreement by states jointly to expend resources
and share control of a common enterprise? While these are
all interesting questions, the fact is that the Charter rules governing the prohibition on aggression are indeterminate and
do not yield easy answers.
86. TANCA, supra note 54, at 171.
87. An attempt to draw serious lessons on the basis of three interventions
necessarily enters dangerous territory.
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Traditionally, to justify recourse to Article 51 collective
self-defense states must claim that they have been the victim of
an armed attack. Yet the truth or falsity of such a claim is
often hard to determine."8 In addition, states may argue that
intervention to protect one's nationals derives from customary
international law that predates the Charter, or that this type of
intervention is justified only in the case of an armed attack.
Without over-emphasizing the fact that there was no explicit
condemnation of either state, one tentative lesson that can be
drawn from the intervention in the Congo is that the international community was more willing to sanction the use of force
when the foreign intervenors acted in a limited way to evacuate or protect their nationals. At the same time, the reaction to
the intervention also demonstrated that many African nations
remain extremely sensitive to foreign interventions that are
tinged with colonial overtones. The cases suggest that multilateral interventions that adhere to coherent, consistent, and
clear standards stand a better chance of success than those
that do not.
The classification of an intervention as either an enforcement or peacekeeping mission will have a major effect upon
whether the intervention is perceived as legitimate or legal.
When the OAS was originally created, its founding charter did
not make any express provision for either enforcement or
peacekeeping action. Regional and sub-regional organizations
that lack authority to conduct enforcement operations have
become increasingly aware, however, of the possibilities that
their own peacekeeping efforts have for the settlement of intrastate conflict.8 9
88. GRAy, supra note 25, at 121-22 (noting that cases involving the claims
of collective self-defense typically turn on the factual question of whether
there was an armed conflict).
89. See Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2

U.S.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3; David D.Jividen, It Takes a Region: A Proposalfor
an Alternative Regional Approach to UN Collective Farce HumanitarianIntervention,
10 U.S. A.F. ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 125-26 (1999-2000); Sylvester
Ekundayo Rowe, ECOMOG: A Model for African Peace-Keeping, AFR. LAW To-

DAY, at 3, Oct. 1998, available at http://allafrica.com.
The scope of
peacekeeping is expanding to fit the challenges posed by intrastate conflict:
"Peacekeeping for both the United Nations and ECOWAS now involves such
activities such as observation and verification of cease-fire agreements, security/protection for refugees and humanitarian relief workers, demobilization
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A related consequence is that these organizations have begun to view their mandates as encompassing broader responsibilities. Despite the seeming conflict between mandate and
practice, the international community has not spent much
time inquiring into whether organizations like the OAS have
power under their own constitutions to engage in peacekeeping or enforcement activities but have focused instead on the
requirements of international law as stated by the U.N. Charter. "When regional organizations have engaged in the use of
force the legality of such action has been assessed by the rest
of the world not in terms of the organization's own constitution but rather in terms of the UN Charter and general inter'"
national law."'
While it may be tempting to read too much
into the absence of debate on the topic, the shift in focus may
reflect a shared understanding that regional organizations are
viewed increasingly as legitimate mechanisms to occupy the
field of both peacekeeping and enforcement actions in intrastate conflicts.
The French and Belgian intervention in Zaire bears some
resemblance to the intervention by Belgium and the United
States in the Congo in 1964 and the intervention in the D.R. in
1978. In those cases, the interventionists defended their actions by resort to a perceived right to protect their nationals.
Unlike the situations in the Congo or the D.R., however, the
threat posed to the foreign nationals in Zaire was substantial.
In addition, the fact that the intervention in Zaire garnered
significant multilateral military support from a host of states
likely increased its legitimacy in the eyes of still other states.
Based on these studies, one might infer that interventions to
rescue nationals will face less opposition if the intervening
forces have broad multilateral support, act to withdraw their
troops immediately, and do not attempt to change the status
quo within the target state.

and disarmament of combatants, and observation of democratic political
processes in the form of elections and referenda." Id.
90. GRAy, supa note 25, at 209.
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Interventionsfor Humanitarianand Regional
Stability Purposes

The ECOMOG Intervention in Liberia

In December 1989, Charles Taylor, a former minister
under the ruling regime of President Samuel Doe of Liberia,9 '
organized and led a rebel force in C6te d'Ivoire with the hope
of unseating Doe. Taylor's actions precipitated the outbreak
of civil war in Liberia between his National Patriotic Front
(NPFL) and Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). 92 By July
1990, the NPFL appeared close to taking control, but a splinter group of the NPFL, the Independent National Patriotic
Front of Liberia ("INPFL"), led by Prince Yormie Johnson, added yet another dimension to the civil war. 9: By August, various ethnic groups were fighting each other, and ordinary civilians increasingly became the targets of their attacks. Approximately 5,000 deaths were reported, and another 500,000
people fled the country. 94 Liberia reported that over a million
citizens had been displaced, equaling roughly sixty percent of
95
the Liberian population.
In response to the burgeoning crisis, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) decided to send a
peacekeeping force to Liberia. The organization called on "all
warring parties to observe an immediate cease-fire," and gave
its military arm, the Economic Community of West African
States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the power to keep the
peace, restore law and order, and insure that the cease-fire was
respected. 96 The vast majority of the ECOMOG force came
from Nigeria, with smaller contingents also coming from
91. Doe ousted President William R. Tolbert Jr. in a military coup on

April 12, 1980. MARK

HUBAND, THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR

14-15 (1998).

92. CHESTERMAN, supra note 27, at 135.
93. Id.
94. Id.; LIBERIA: Civil War-Sending of ECOWAS Force-Large-scaleCasual
ties, 36 KEESING'S REc. OF WORLD EVENTS 37,644, 37,644 (1990) [hereinafter
LIBERIA-Civil War]. This figure includes 300,000 persons who fled to
Guinea, 120,000 to C6te d'Ivoire, and 80,000 to Sierra Leone. LIBERIACivil War, supra, at 37,644.
95. CHESTERMAN, supra note 27, at 135; LIBERIA-Civil War, supra note
94, at 37,644.
96. CHESTER.MAN, supra note 27, at 135.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics

20031

AN UNEASY PEACE

Ghana, the Gambia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone. 9 7 Within two
weeks all ECOMOG troops had arrived in Monrovia, where
they were almost immediately confronted by the NPFL. 98 Nevertheless, ECOMOG forces were able to gain control of part of
Monrovia by September. By November 1990, a cease-fire had
been signed. The agreement was subsequently violated, and
the fighting continued unabated. 99 The Yamoussoukro IV Accords, signed on October 30, 1991, allowed ECOMOG to "confin [el and disarl[m]" the belligerent forces.II'll Four years later
on December 28, 1994, perhaps exhausted by the endless conflict, the groups agreed to sign a cease-fire agreement. Unlike
the previous cease-fire, this agreement was observed by all parties. Within two weeks, the installation of a temporary government, the Council of State, had been completed. After another seven weeks had passed, the demobilization process had
begun. Within 21 weeks, preparations for holding elections
had begun, and after 42 weeks elections were held. °
ECOMOG's essential function was to act as a buffer between the various armed groups. 0 2 The question is whether
ECOMOG remained true to this mandate or whether its actions crossed the line from peacekeeping to enforcement action. Though ECOWAS sought U.N. approval for its operations prior to commencing them, " 3 ECOMOG did not have
the consent of either of the Liberian factions, and had no basis
97. Id.; U.N. SCOR, Ninth Progress Report of the Secretary-General,50th Sess.,

U.N. Doc. S/1995/158 (1995).
20.

98.
99.

CHIESTERMAN,

supra note 27, at 135.
HuMN RIGHTS

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH,

WATCH WORLD REPORT

1993

100. Letter Dated 28 October 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Benin to
the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR,
47th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/24735 (1992).
101. See ADEKEYE ADEBAJO, LIBERIA'S CIVIL WAR: NIGERIA, ECOMOG, AND
REGIONAL SECURITY IN WEST AFRICA

162 (2002).

102. See supra text accompanying note 100; Rowe, supra note 89, at 3. But
see GRAY, supra note 25, at 217 (noting "some ambiguity as to whether the
role of the force was simply to act as a buffer between opposing forces or
whether it was to help the government that issued the invitation to defeat
the opposition").
103. Letter Dated 9 August 1990from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to
the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. S/21485 (1990) (forwarding letter statement of Dr. Rilwanu
Lukman, Nigerian Minister of External Affairs, requesting "moral support"
of the United Nations for ECOWAS actions).
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under the ECOWAS constitution for its operation.11 4 Though
the Liberian government had requested U.N. assistance in
June 1990, the Security Council did not become involved in
the conflict until January 1991-at least five months after
ECOMOG entered Liberia. '15- In fact, the U.N.'s silence as to
the legal basis for ECOMOG action in both the Security Council slatements0° 6 and in Security Council resolutions11 7 was
profound. According to Gray, "the legal basis for the
ECOMOG operation was not much discussed by those involved or by the UN. Little attention was paid to the legality of
the action under ECOMOG's own mandate and under its constitution." t
In November 1992, with little debate, the Council passed
Resolution 788 and found that: "the deterioration of the situation in Liberia constitutes a threat to international peace and
security, and particularly in West Africa as a whole." 111
1 In this
and two succeeding documents, the Security Council gave explicit retroactive approval to the ECOWAS/ECOMOG operation: "Welcoming" ECOWAS for its attempts to bring about
peace in Liberia, "welcoming" OAU support and endorsement
of these actions, and "commending" African states contributing troops to ECOMOG. 11
104. CIHES ERMAN, su)ra note 27, at 136.
105. Id.; U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2974th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2974
(1991). Speaking on behalf of the Council members, the President of the
Security Council "commend [ed] the efforts made by the ECOWAS Heads of
State and Government to promote peace and normalcy in Liberia ... and
call [ed] upon the parties to the conflict in Liberia to continue to respect the
cease-fire agreement .... " U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2974th mtg. at 9, U.N.
Doc. S/PV.2974 (1991).
106. See id. at 9; see also Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N.

SCOR, 47th Sess., 3071st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/23886 (1992).
107. See S.C. Res. 788, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3138th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/
RES/788 (1992) (adopted unanimously); see also S.C. Res. 813, U.N. SCOR,
48th Sess., 3187th nitg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/813 (1993) (adopted unanimously); S.C. Res. 856, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3263rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/
RES/856 (1993); S.C. Res. 866, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3281st mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/866 (1993).
108. GRAN', supra note 25, at 212.
109. S.C. Res. 788, supra note 107.
110. Id.; seeS.C. Res. 813, supra note 107; S.C. Res. 1116, U.N. SCOR, 52d
Sess., 3793d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1116 (1997); see also Note by the President
of the Security Council,U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3233d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/25918
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In Resolution 788 the Council specifically referred to
Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter and recalled Article 52's
broad support for the work of regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security consistent with the
purposes and principles of the U.N. In addition, the Security
Council: (1) deplored the attacks made against UNOMIL and
ECOMOG personnel; (2) regretted "that sufficient financial
support . . . for ECOMOG troops [was] not yet forthcoming; " 1 and (3) gave ECOWAS the sole exemption from its
general embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military
1 2
equipment to Liberia. !
Despite the lack of prior authorization from the Security
Council, many states supported ECOMOG's intervention.
Zimbabwe, Botswana, Egypt, and Zambia expressed their support by contributing troops to the peacekeeping force.' II The
United States also supported the ECOMOG action." 4 Yet the
states that continued to support the NPFL-Burkina Faso and
Ivory Coast were allegedly in this camp in 1992-suggested
that ECOMOG's reasons for involvement in the conflict were
1 15
not as altruistic as they appeared.
2.

The U.S. and British Intervention in Iraq on Behalf of the
Kurdish Population

The Kurds are largely Sunni/Muslim-distinct from
Turks and Arabs and related to Iranians-but are still divided
tribally, geographically, politically, linguistically, and ideologically. They comprise significant minority populations in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.l" 6 For years the Kurds have tried to
(1993) ("The Council remains firmly supportive of the efforts of the
ECOWAS and the Secretary-General to bring peace to Liberia.").
111. See Statement 1t, the President of the SecuritY Council, 54th Sess., 3404th
rntg., U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1994/33 (1994); see also U.N. SCOR, Sixth Progress
Report of the Secretary General On The United Nations Observer Mission In Liberia,
49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/1006 (1994).
112. S.C. Res. 788, supra note 107.
113. Peter da Costa, Liberia: Mediators Hold Breath on Ceasefire Agreement,
Inter Press Service, July 26, 1993, 1993 WL 2538187.
114. Liberia: U.S. Insists It Backs Peacekeeping Force, INTER PRESS SERVICE,
Nov. 12, 1992, 1992 WL 2485003.
115. Id.
116. See Michael M. Gunter, The Kurdish Question and International Law, in
THE KURDISH QUESTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL
RIGHTS OF THE KURDISH PEOPLE

22, 22 (Mohammed M.A. Ahmed & Michael
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gain a measure of recognition and autonomy in the international community." 17 By and large they have not been able to
garner much support; most of their rebellions have failed. In
retaliation, Saddam Hussein carried out a systematic campaign
in 1988, called "The Anfal," to exterminate the Kurds.' 1 8 Iraqi
troops killed over 100,000 Kurdish men, women, and children. 1 19 In March 1988, Iraqi air forces reportedly attacked
the city of Halabja with chemical weapons. 120 In August 1988,
after the ceasefire agreement in the Iran-Iraq war was concluded, more villages were attacked with chemical weapons
and more unarmed civilians were killed.' 2 ' Approximately 1.5
million Iraqi Kurds were forced to flee to Iran and Turkey despite desperate weather conditions. 122 Iraq's chemical weapon
campaign of the 1980s was denounced but not officially sanctioned by the international community. 2 " Regional organizations that did attempt to respond to the humanitarian crisis
1 24
were stymied by indecision, conflict, and lack of agreement.
In March 1991, the Arab League failed to issue any condemnation of the treatment of the Kurds. Similarly, the Gulf
Cooperation Council condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in
August 1990 but failed to take any significant role in the Kurdish crisis. 125 Perhaps hoping to capitalize on Saddam Hussein's defeat in the Gulf War, the Iraqi Kurdish population led
another uprising in the northern areas of Iraq in the same
year. Saddam Hussein again moved to suppress the uprising.
Turkish officials estimated that one million Iraqi Kurds might
M. Gunter eds., 2000). Rough estimates postulate that there are approximately 10 to 12 million Kurds living in Turkey, 6 million in Iran, 3.5 to 4
million in Iraq, and 800,000 in Syria. Id.
117. See Kanan Makiva, The Anfal: Uncovering an Iraqi Campaign to Exterminate the Kurds, HARPER'S, May 1992, at 53, 54.
118. See id. at 53, 58.
119. See id. at 58-59.
120. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN REL., I00TH CONG., CHEIMICAL
WEAPONS USE IN KURDISTAN:
IRAQ'S FINAL OFFENSIVE 30 (Comm. Print
1988).
121. See id. at 11-31 (providing a narrative constructed from eyewitness
accounts of Kurdish refugees).
122. See Gunter, supra note 116, at 35-36.
123. SeeJane E. Stromseth, Iraq's Repression of Its Civilian Population: Collective Responses and Continuing Challenges, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT, supra note
11, at 77, 81.
124. See id. at 84.
125. See id.
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and Iran counted 500,000 refugees in early April alone.
Both states agreed that the refugee flows constituted a threat
to regional security and demanded that the Security Council
respond to the crisis. 1 27 Faced with these increasing complaints regarding the cross-border refugee flows caused by
Iraqi repression, the United States and its Allies initiated Operation Provide Comfort. The operation established no-fly zones
in order to encourage the return of the displaced Kurdish
population. A coalition of thirteen different states participated in the rescue operation.
The U.N. response to Iraq's treatment of its Kurdish population was embodied in Resolution 688, which was adopted
on April 5, 1991.128 The Security Council first reaffirmed the
principle of non-intervention: All states should respect the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and all states in the
region. The Council then stated that the consequences of
Iraqi repression-the massive outflow of refugees into neighboring territories-constituted a threat to international peace
and security:
Gravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most
recently in Kurdish-populated areas, which led to a
massive flow of refugees towards and across international frontiers and to cross-border incursions which
threaten international peace and security in the region.... 129
Condemns the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most recently in
Kurdish-populated areas, the consequences of which
threaten international peace and security in the region ....130
flee, 1 2 6

126. See U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982nd mrtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2982
(1991) (remarks of Mr. Askin, Turkey).
127. See id. at 6-8 (remarks of Mr. Askin, Turkey); id. at 13-15 (remarks of
Mr. Kharrazi, Islamic Republic of Iran).
128. S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/
RES/688 (1991).
Austria, Belgium, Cote d'Ivoire, Ecuador, France,
Romania, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States
voted in favor of the resolution; voting against were Cuba, Yemen, and
Zimbabwe. Id. China and India abstained. Id.
129. Id.
3.

130. Id.

1.
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The resolution then demanded an immediate end to the
repression and insisted that Iraq open its borders to international humanitarian aid for the Kurds in northern Iraq. What
is most interesting about the resolution is that though it demanded that Iraq cease its repression and allow access to international humanitarian organizations, it was not passed under
Chapter VII. Consequently, there was no authorization for the
use of force to protect the Kurds and Shiite Muslims. The Security Council resolution was thus very limited in its scope; it
only established the existence of a threat to the peace due to
the flow of refugees streaming across Iraq's borders into Turkey and Iran.
Between December 1991 and 1994, debates in the General Assembly tracked the concerns and conclusions of the Security Council. A series of resolutions detailed the alleged
ongoing human rights abuses conducted by the Iraqi government. 3 ' Resolution 46/134 first set out the obligations that
Iraq, as party to several international agreements regarding
human rights, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, was violating. The resolution then described the abuses allegedly being committed by
Iraq against its citizens: Arbitrary arrests and detentions, disappearances, extrajudicial killings, summary executions, use of
persons as "human shields," the use of chemical weapons, the
forced displacement of thousands, and systematic torture were

131. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 47/145, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess.,
9, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/47/145 (1992) ("express[ing] special alarm at all internal embargoes,
which prevent the equitable enjoyment of basic foodstuffs and medical supplies .. ."); see also G.A. Res. 48/144, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess.,
2, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/48/144 (1993) ("[e]xpress[ing] its strong condemnation of...
[s]ummary and arbitrary executions, orchestrated mass executions and burials, extrajudicial killings, including political killings, in particular in the
northern region of Iraq, in southern Shiah centres and in the southern marshes..."); G.A. Res. 49/203, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess.,
2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
49/203 (1994) ("[e]xpress[ing] its strong condemnation of... [t]he enactment and implementation of recent decrees prescribing cruel and unusual
punishment, namely, mutilation as a penalty for certain offenses and the
abuse and diversion of medical care services for the purposes of such legalized mutilations . . .').
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all part of a "general structured programme of repression
1' 2
aimed at quelling opposition." 1
The United States, the U.K., and France all relied upon
these resolutions as implied support for their establishment of
safe havens for the Kurds within Iraq. However, Resolution
688 turned out to be one of the most controversial and least
supported of all the resolutions immediately following the
Gulf War. A few states, such as Romania and Zaire, commented that the resolution seemed to completely disregard
Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter."'" On the other hand, the
intervention by the Allies was seemingly legitimated by the
4
U.N.'s decision to take over responsibility for the operation.l_
Again, Resolution 688 is almost more significant for the
things that it failed to do than for the things it actually accomplished: (1) It did not expressly authorize the use of military
force to protect Iraqi Kurds and Shiites from Saddam Hussein
(in fact, earlier debates in the Security Council demonstrate
that military force to this end was not contemplated); (2) the
resolution did not state a position on the merits of the Kurdish
struggle for solidarity; and (3) the resolution did not require
the consent of the host country, as was the usual practice,
before mandating that Iraq allow humanitarian monitoring organizations to enter the country.'135 Realizing that the resolution provided minimal authorization for the Allied Operation,
U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar expressed reservations about the legality of the operation absent explicit Secur13 6
ity Council Authorization.
The Allies' decision to act notwithstanding the limits of
Resolution 688 was significant because it demonstrated some
of the underlying motivations for the intervention. The Allied
decision to intervene was likely based on considerations beyond the looming humanitarian catastrophe, such as concerns
for strategic interests implicated in the region and a sense of
corporate responsibility for the Gulf War. On the other hand,
the intervention on behalf of the Kurds might suggest that the
132. Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, G.A. Res. 46/134, U.N. GAOR, 46th

Sess., T 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/134 (1991).
133. TANCA, supra note 54, at 187.
134. See id.

135. See Stromseth, supra note 123, at 88-89.

136. See Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. Scouting Refugee Sites Well Inside haq's Borders,
Aiming to Lure Kurds Home, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1991, at Al.
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international community has become more willing to respond
to a state's repression of its own citizens, particularly when the

transboundary effects of the conflict spill into neighboring regions.

3.

The ECOMOG Intervention in Sierra Leone

In March 1991, fighters of the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF) attempted to overthrow the government of Sierra Leone. The rebels launched their war from the east of the country near the Liberian border where ongoing conflict had already been threatening to spill over into Sierra Leone. Despite a change in the government and the election of Ahmed
Kabbah in 1996, the attacks from the RUF continued. Then,
in May 1997 the Armed Forces Revolutionary Committee
(AFRC) overthrew Kabbah's government and invited the

rebels to join the military junta. 1 37 President Kabbah fled to
Guinea, where he subsequently appealed to Nigeria and other

1 38
countries to intervene on his behalf.
In response to the crisis, the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) unanimously voted to condemn the coup. The

OAU then urged Sierra Leone's regional neighbors to "take all
3

necessary measures" to return President Kabbah to office.1 9
The New York Times reported that: "A West African force led

by Nigeria went on the offensive today to put down an eight137. See

EARL CONTEH-MORGAN & MAC DIXON-FYLE, SIERRA LEONE AT THE

HISTORY, POLITICS, AND SOCIE'n, 126-27,
145-49 (1999).
138. Howard W. French, NigeriansFire on Rebels Who Seized Sierra Leone, N.Y.
TIMlS, June 3, 1997, at AI0. At the time of the coup, Nigerian forces were
already present in Sierra Leone to aid the government in responding to the
instability emanating from the neighboring war in Liberia. See SIERRA LEONE: Repercussions of Liberian Civil War, KEESING'S REC. OF WORLD Ev\rNTs,
38,136, 38,136 (1991). Nigerian involvement was viewed as suspect from the
beginning:
Nigeria, the leading troop and financial contributor to the
peacekeeping group, was being ruled by an illegal military regime
under General Sani Abacha, and was under suspension from the
United Nations for its human rights violations. ECOMOG's operations in Sierra Leone, unfortunately became entangled in perceptions of Nigeria's internal politics, and in the "big power" syndrome
associated with that country's foreign policy.
Rowe, supra note 89, at 1.
139. CHESTERMAN, supra note 27, at 155.
END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY:
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day old military coup in Sierra Leone, sending ships, planes
and troops into action against rebel targets in Freetown, the
capital."' 140 On October 24, 1997, after five months of fighting,
the junta and an ECOWAS mediation committee signed an
agreement in Conakry, Guinea which was to restore constitutional order. 14 1 Although Kabbah was eventually returned to
government, the fighting continued. In 1998, the RUF, with
its allies, began another offensive aimed at entering Freetown.
Ultimately the rebels succeeded, and byJanuary 1999 they had
taken over part of the city.142
On January 7, 1999, ECOMOG conducted an aerial
bombing raid on Freetown. The group justified its offensive
14
by asserting the need to enforce earlier-imposed sanctions. By the end of the month, the ECOMOG offensive was successful, and the organization managed to dislodge the rebels from
Freetown. Amid continued violence, peace negotiations between President Kabbah and Foday Sankoh, leader of the
RUF, started and stopped several times between February and
April. On April 18, the U.N. flew Sankoh to Lom6 to discuss
peace proposals.144 By July 7, the government and the RUF
had signed an agreement that would integrate members of the
RUF into the government and disarm, demobilize, and reinte45
grate the combatants to end hostilities.
Sierra Leone's citizens' reactions to the intervention varied. While many civilians were happy to be able to return
home, the New York Times reported that thousands of young
Sierra Leonians converged in the streets to protest the intervention. 146 Much of the criticism focused on the unequal
composition of the ECOMOG forces: Many citizens expressed
140. French, supra note 138, at A10.
141. SIERRA IE0NE: Clashes Between Government and Intervention Force, 44
KEESING'S REC. OF WORLD EVENTS 41,992, 41,992 (1998). See also Telephone
interview with Sylvester E. Rowe, Ambassador, Deputy Permanent Representative for Political Affairs to the United Nations (Mar. 27, 2002).
142. SIERRA LEONE: Intensification of Fighting, 44 KEESING'S REC. OF
WORLD EV-ENTS 42,659, 42,659 (Dec. 1998); SIERRA IJONE: Rebel Invasion of
Capital, 45 KEESING'S REc. OF WORLD EVENTS 42,708, 42,708 (Jan. 1999).
143. SIERRA LEONE: Clashes Between Government and Intervention Force,
supra note 141, at 41,992.
144. SIERRA LEONE: Violent Backdrop to PeaceProcess, 45 KEESING'S REC. OF
WORLD EVENTS

42,877, 42,877 (April 1999).

145. Telephone interview with Sylvester E. Rowe, supra note 141.
146. French, supra note 138, at A10.
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distrust of Nigeria's motivations for involvement in the conflict. For example, Abbas Bundu, a former foreign minister of
Sierra Leone told the BBC: "West Africans would expect
Nigerians to implement democracy in their own country
first."' 147 International reaction to the 1997 coup was also
mixed.
According to media commentators at the time, "Nigeria's
offensive enjoys the apparent if not explicit support of the Organization of African Unity and the association of Britain and
its former colonies known as the Commonwealth."' 148 In the
first Security Council mention of the intervention, the Council
did not authorize the use of force in Sierra Leone but merely
expressed concern.1 4 1 The Security Council eventually voted
to give explicit retroactive approval for ECOMOG's intervention. On October 8, 1997, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1132, which did three important things: (1) demanded
that the military junta relinquish power in favor of a democratically elected government; (2) determined that a Chapter VII
threat to international peace and security did exist; and (3)
expressly authorized ECOWAS, under Chapter VIII, to cut the
AFRC off from foreign supplies of war "matrie"' 50 The last
provision could be interpreted as implicit authorization for
ECOWAS to use military force. Furthermore, on April 17,
1998, the Council adopted Resolution 1162 in which it: "Commends the Economic Community of West African States and its
military observer group (ECOMOG), deployed in Sierra Leone .... 151
147. Id. At the time, Nigeria was ruled by a military junta that had seized
power from a democratically elected government, and thus was commonly
perceived as being one of the least democratic countries in Africa. See Richard Joseph, Democratization Under Military Rule and Repression in Nigeria, in
DILEMMAS OF DEMOCRC\cY IN NJGERIA, 137, 137-38 (Paul A. Beckett & Crawford Young eds., 1997).
148. French, supra note 138, at A10.
149. Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess.,
3809th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PRST/1997/29 (1997).
150. S.C. Res. 1132, U.N. SCOR, 52d Sess., 3822d mtg.
8, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1132 (1997).
151. Specifically, the Security Council commended ECOMOG on "the important role they [were] playing in support of the objectives related to the
restoration of peace and security .... S.C. Res. 1162, U.N. SCOR, 53rd
Sess., 3872nd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1162 (1998).
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One of the primary objectives of the ECOWAS Peace Plan
for Sierra Leone was the restoration of President Kabbah's
constitutional government. 52 Viewed from this standpoint,
ECOMOG's actions were perfectly legal.' 5 " The lingering
question is whether the intervention was also perceived as legitimate.
4.

The NATO Intervention in Kosovo

It has been argued that the spark that ignited the Balkan Wars
was Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's decision to remove Kosovo's autonomy in 1989. This decision played on Serbian fears of
of the Serbs'
ethnic domination in Kosovo and invoked the memory
5 4
defeat at the hands of the Turks six centuries earlier.1
NATO's decision on March 24, 1999, to initiate a bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
was met with heavy criticism throughout the international
community. Even within the organization's own ranks, it was
not fully understood why the campaign was undertaken. Reportedly, NATO's original plan was to resist intervention. Indeed, NATO official strategists, when asked about the possibility of future strikes against the Serbs in Kosovo, responded
that neither the United States nor NATO had any intention of
helping the rebels in their campaign for independence. 155
One official from the Department of Defense (speaking on
condition of anonymity) stated: "They [the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA)] need to know . .. that the cavalry is not coming."'1 5 1 To understand why NATO policy in Kosovo changed,
one must understand the events ongoing in the FRY prior to
1998. The conflict in Kosovo began as a non-violent campaign
to win self-determination, yet ended with the deaths of approximately 10,000 ethnic Albanians and the displacement of
152. See Letter Dated 28 October 1997from the Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N.
SCOR, 52d Sess., at 5, U.N. Doc. A/1997/824 (1997); Rowe, supra note 89,
at 1.
153. Rowe, supra note 89, at 1 ("No member of the 16-nation ECOWAS
ever questioned the legality of the intervention.
154. CHESTERMAN, supra note 27, at 207.
155. Steven Lee Myers, AATO Threat to Intervene in Kosovo Fades as Rebels
Succeed, N.Y. TiNIES, July 16, 1998, at A12.
156. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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1998 and June

The Kosovo crisis originated hundreds of years ago, but
this extremely condensed factual narrative will begin with the
eruption of a new wave of nationalism within Kosovo in the
1970s and 1980s. 158 Kosovo was a place of ethnic pride for
both Albanians and Serbs living within the province,1 59 yet Albanians vastly outnumbered Serbs. Nationalism in part led to
Slobodan Milosevic's meteoric rise to power through the rank
and file of Serbian leaders.'1'11 Milosevic advocated an "extreme Serbian nationalist agenda."'"" Thus, in 1989, Milosevic
announced that Kosovo and Vojvodina, formerly autonomous
provinces, would lose their right to self-government. These
developments occurred simultaneously with the steady disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; after the loss of
autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina, the six other republics
(Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bos1 2
nia-Herzegovina) initiated demands for independence. 6
In Kosovo, Milosevic systematically removed the social, political, and cultural rights once freely enjoyed by the ethnic
Albanian majority. In response, Kosovar Albanians coordinated a largely non-violent protest campaign from 1989 until
1997. Seeing little progress in this movement, however, the
Kosovo Liberation Army commenced guerrilla activities in
157. SeeTHE

Kosovo REPORT: CON1-2 (2000) [hereinafter
THE Kosovo REPORT]. The numbers are by no means exact and differ markedly depending on the phase of the conflict: Phase one was from Feb. 1998
to March 1999, and phase two was from Mar. 24, 1999, to June 19, 1999,
during the period of NATO bombing. See also Agon Demjaha, The Kosovo
Conflict: A Perspectivefrom Inside, in Kosovo AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANIINDEP. INT'L COMMI'N ON

Kosovo,

THE

FLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED

TARIAN INTERVENTION:
TERNATIONAL

SELEC-TIVE INDIGNATION,

CITIZENSHIP

2000) [hereinafter

COLLEC-TI\E ACTION, AND IN-

34 (Albrecht Schnabel & Ramesh Thakur eds.,

Kosovo AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVFN

-

(estimating 2,000 Albanians killed and 400,000 Albanians displaced
between March and October 1998).
158. Entire books have been written on the intervention in Kosovo, and
unfortunately space does not allow for a full accounting here. For an extremely detailed report complete with factual findings and recommendations, see THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 157.
159. Id. at 33.
160. Id. at 34.
161. Id.
162. See id.
TION]
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1997 and 1998. The Serbian police began to carry out reprisals on both the rebel forces and Albanian villagers and civil-

ians. 163

Milosevic and the Allied authorities then signed the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, but did not address the Kosovar
Albanians' demands for independence. Three years later in
1998, Milosevic commenced a systematic program of ethnic
cleansing of Kosovar Albanians within the province; as a result,
hundreds of thousands were both internally and externally displaced." t1 4 In March 1999, NATO air strikes began. According
to NATO authorities, the intervention was thought necessary
to avert a serious humanitarian catastrophe due to Milosevic's
5
repression of ethnic Albanians.16
Kosovo's strategic placement in the center of an already
tense region provided yet another justification for intervention. The countries surrounding the FRY had interests that
would be affected by the outcome of the war; Greece, Macedonia, and Montenegro all possessed significant populations of
Albanians within their territories.' 6 6 Milosevic's campaign to
expel and persecute hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians showed no immediate signs of abating in either its severity
or its scope. The potential for the conflict to spill over into
neighboring regions seemed to increase steadily: American
and other foreign monitors present in Kosovo could hardly ignore the specter of freshly filled mass graves outside rural vil163.

WILLIAM

G.

O'NEILl.,

Kosovo: AN

UNFINISHED PEACE

21-24 (2002);

Marie-Janine Calic, Kosovo in the Twentieth Century: A Historic Account, in KoSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION 19, 27-28, supra
note 157; William G. O'Neill, Comments to First Draft, An Uneasy Peace
(Feb. 2002) (unpublished) [hereinafter O'Neill, Comments].
164. Calic, supra note 163, at 28-29. William G. O'Neill of the Interna-

tional Peace Academy remarked: "Of note is the fact that the ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia] indictment of Milosevic
only includes a genocide charge for his actions in Bosnia, not Kosovo."
O'Neill, Comments, supra note 163.
165. Francis X. Clines, Missiles Rock Kosovo Capital, Belgrade and Other Sites,
N.Y. TIMoES, Mar. 25, 1999, at Al; R.W. Apple,Jr., A Fresh Set of U.S. Goals, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at Al.
166. George Khutsishvili & Albert Schnabel, The Kosovo Conflict: The

Balkans and the Souther Caucasus, in Kosovo AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUNIANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 157, at 64, 66-67; Georgios Kastakos, The
Southern Rank: Italy, Greece, Turkey, in Kosovo AND THE CHALLENGE OF HuiANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 157, at 166, 171, 173.
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lages or the steady forced marches of Albanians out of the
67
province. 1
In adopting Resolution 49/204, the General Assembly deplored the reports of ethnic cleansing carried out by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against the Kosovar Albanians. 168
Specifically, the resolution examined and criticized human
rights violations including: Police brutality against ethnic Albanians; arbitrary searches, seizures and arrests; forced evictions; torture of detainees; discrimination against, and arbitrary dismissals of, ethnic Albanian civil servants; the closing of
all Albanian cultural and scientific institutions; the elimination
in practice of the Albanian language; and many other discriminatory and repressive practices aimed at Albanians in Kosovo. 169 Eventually, the confluence of these factors helped to
crystallize the international denunciation of Milosevic's regime. 170
5.

Lessons Learned

The problem of legitimacy is one that regional, sub-regional, or collective defense organizations cannot safely ignore. The proliferation of intrastate conflict poses serious
problems for regional stability that must be addressed. Yet
what happens when one state, for example Nigeria in the Liberian case study, dominates an organization to the point that its
actions are not perceived as multilateral? 17 1 Should ECOMOG
be praised for its efforts in ending the civil war, or condemned
167. Steven Lee Meyers, NATO Opens a Broad Barrage Against the Serbs Over
Kosovo, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at A1;John M. Border, President's Reasons:
Moral Revulsion and Weight of U.S. Interests, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1999, at Al 5.

168. See G.A. Res. 49/204, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/
204 (1994) (condemning discrimination against and repression of ethnic
Albanians in Yugoslavia).
169. Id. 4.
170. See S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4011th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/

RES/1244 (1999); see also Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuant to Paragraph
10 of Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999), U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/1999/
672 (1999); Craig R. Whitney, France Urges Allies to Define Planfor Autonomy for

Kosovo, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 1998, at A6 (explaining why, while both Russia
and China initially opposed NATO's military intervention in Kosovo and
threatened to use their veto to oppose any intervention, neither state chose
to do this).

171. See David Wippman, Enforcing the Peace: ECOWAS and the Liberian Civil
War, in ENFORCINc. RESTRAINrT, supra note 11, at 157, 191-92.
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for prolonging it? The same concerns are apparent with the
NATO intervention in Kosovo. ECOWAS was originally created to address the problem of West African economic integration. 17 2 The organization's charter does not contain a mandate for enforcement actions. Yet ECOWAS has taken an increasingly active role in local attempts to enforce peace within
West Africa.
These responses may constitute de facto recognition by
states that sub-regional and regional organizations may provide a viable solution to the rising tide of intrastate conflict.
Many states in West Africa supported the organization's intervention in Liberia because the conflict had spilled outside of
Liberia's boundaries and become a serious threat to regional
and international stability. In Africa, the problem presented
by transboundary spillage from neighboring conflicts is particularly worrisome. The war in Sierra Leone further demonstrates why the international community cannot discount the
173
impact of interlocking regional tensions.
Another potential lesson from the study of the conflict in
Sierra Leone is that the successful resolution of complex humanitarian crises requires more than just a military response.
ECOMOG's essential task was to stop the fighting between the
different sides, to stop the attacks on civilians, and to return a
measure of stability to the country. Ultimately however, multilateral, regional, and sub-regional groups need to think strategically about viable methods of sustaining peace. A few African states and organizations are currently struggling to create
and implement their own "mechanisms for peace and secur74
ity" within their respective regions. 1

172. Id. at 165.
173. SeeJOHN L. HuzscHi, SIERRA LEONE: DIAMONDS AND lTIE STRUGGLE FOR
DEMOCRAC-N 25 (2001) (noting that diamonds from Sierra Leone have financed rebel movements in other African countries).
174. William Thorn, Africa's Security Issues through 2010, MIL. REv.,July-Aug.
2000, at 5-7. For example, the East African Cooperation, made up of Kenya,
Tanzania, and Uganda, has conducted joint military exercises. Id. at 6. See
also Rowe supra note 89, at 3 ("[F]ollowing the signing of a memorandum of
understanding, troops from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda have organized
joint military exercises .... Member states of the Southern African Develop-

ment Community (SADC) have also been actively considering legally binding agreements for military cooperation.").
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Having regional and sub-regional organizations address
these issues has several advantages. Their proximity to the
sources of tension will certainly help them to respond more
quickly to civil conflicts. These organizations will also often
possess both significant expertise and more incentives to seek
peaceable resolution of local conflicts, and thus may be able to
summon the requisite political will for action more quickly
and efficiently than may be possible at the U.N. Even at its
best, the decision-making process at the U.N. is slow and laborious, and the requisite political will for interventions in distant and seemingly intractable conflicts is often lacking. One
significant disadvantage to this approach, however, is that
many regional and sub-regional organizations simply do not
have the capacity to manage intrastate conflict successfully. African states recently emerged from colonial domination traditionally have been very protective of their sovereignty. When
threatened with the massive effects of civil conflict, however,
these states may be inclined to support a higher degree of
outside interference.
It is difficult to draw unambiguous conclusions from the
Kosovo case study. According to the Kosovo Report, "[t]he
overall narratives of the international response are inherently
inconclusive, and hence without clear 'lessons' beyond the
prudential observations in favor of early engagement and
greater attentiveness to nonviolent options."' 1 75 However, in
one sense, Kosovo exemplifies the unprecedented challenges
that now face the international community-illustrated by the
flawed assumptions that resulted in a lack of preparation for a
hitherto unanticipated humanitarian demand.
One possible lesson of the Kosovo conflict is that the effect of public opinion and the role of mass media is not one to
be taken lightly. The images of nearly one million Kosovar
Albanians being expelled from Kosovo into Macedonia and Albania, combined with reports of attacks on helpless civilians
and the discovery of mass graves, did much to keep the NATO
coalition unified. The intervention in Kosovo suggests that in
situations where humanitarian catastrophe looms, the international community may not allow gridlock in the U.N. to thwart
its determination to intervene.
175.
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There does seem to be consensus for the idea that mass
murder and ethnic cleansing are not within the prerogatives of
sovereign states; on the contrary, states may have the duty to
refrain from such egregious violations against members of
their own citizenry. Perhaps the international community will
be less likely to ignore fundamental human rights violations
that rise to the level of genocide in the future. Nevertheless,
the intervention still raises serious concerns about the legiti7
macy of unwanted military presence in a sovereign state. 6
In the end, the aerial bombardment of Belgrade proved
successful. This result, however, was not clear at the outset of
the conflict; initially it was found that the limited NATO air
strikes were not having the desired effect-they seemed only
to strengthen Milosevic's resolve. The irony is that NATO
went to war to prevent the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo's Albanians, but then refused to send ground troops to protect them.
A common fallacy is that the air strikes alone succeeded in
bringing Milosevic to his knees. The threat to send in ground
troops, which was finally made in May 1999, probably also led
to Milosevic's eventual surrender. The defection of Russian
support for the Milosevic regime was another decisive factor in
the outcome of the conflict. The strikes, combined with the
international pressure exerted on Milosevic, isolated the Belgrade government and hastened the end of the war.
In a broader sense, the Kosovo conflict also speaks to the
failure of conflict-prevention measures. Ignoring the question
of Kosovar autonomy at Dayton was surely a fatal flaw in the
Bosnian peace negotiations. It likely provoked ethnic Albanian discontent and probably contributed to the decision to
disown non-violent resistance as a solution. In addition, the
conflict between the Serbs and the Albanians had been predicted prior to 1989, yet the international community lacked
the requisite political will to address the issue. In allowing
Milosevic to sidestep these issues, the international community
displayed its weak convictions. Milosevic thus felt secure in ignoring countless threats of military intervention and capitalized on this weakness to continue his system of repression virtually unchecked.

176. See THE RESPONSIBILMr'
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CONCLUSION

For some, the new interventions herald a new world in which
human rights trumps state sovereignty;for others, it ushers in a world
in which big powers ride roughshod over the smaller ones, manipulating the rhetoric of humanitarianismand human rights. The controversy has laid bare basic divisions within the internationalcommunity. In the interest of all those victims who suffer and die when leadership and institutions fail, it is crucial that these divisions be
resolved.177
According to more than a few scholars, a new norm is progressively developing that requires states to adhere to minimum citizen protection standards as a condition of holding
the right to govern; following from this premise is the idea that
national and state leaders should be held accountable for failing to meet these standards. 178 The perception of legitimacy is
central to the progressive development of international law.
Multilateral interventions are preferable to unilateral actions
because the presence of many states acting together as a coherent whole adds a measure of legitimacy to the specter of
unwanted foreign military intervention in the affairs of sovereign states.
The conflicts described in the foregoing case studies illustrate the changing face of intrastate conflict. Despite the expansion of the U.N.'s enforcement and peacekeeping duties,
there has not been a parallel expansion in the resources available to the organization. Consequently, regional and other
multilateral actors have tried to fill the void, but these organizations often face capacity and effectiveness problems of their
own. The problem posed by Kofi Annan regarding the international consequences of failure to intervene quickly and efficiently in humanitarian crises, 17- is one that cannot be ignored:
To those for whom the greatest threat to the future
of international order is the use of force in the absence of a Security Council mandate, one might ask,
177. Id. at 2.

178. See, e.g., Landgoed Lauswolt, Using "Any Means Necessay "for Humanitarian Crisis Response (The Stanley Foundation's Thirty-Sixth United Nations
of the Decade Conference), June 17-22, 2001, at 2-3.
179. Rpor, of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N.
GAOR, 54th Sess., 4th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/54/PV.4 (1999).
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not in the context of Kosovo but in the context of
Rwanda, if, in those dark days and hours leading up
to the genocide, a coalition of States had been prepared to act in defence of the Tutsi population, but
did not receive prompt Council authorization,
should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed
the horror to unfold?
In sum, the case studies examined herein suggest six conclusions.
First, the problem of legitimacy is still present whether a
military intervention involves multilateral or unilateral intervention. Second, multilateral action, marked by the participation of two or more states or regional organizations, at least
diminishes the problem of foreign military intervention in the
affairs of non-consenting, sovereign states.
Third, regional organizations, particularly in Africa, have
great potential for intrastate conflict resolution but should rethink their mandates, as the OAU has in its Mechanism for
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. If regional
organizations are to be successful, they will need to receive
broad-based support from the international community.
Fourth, interventions that avoid imposing a particular ideology
and do not attempt to change the status quo of the target state
are less likely to receive criticism than are unilateral actions.
Fifth, the justification of intervention based on the defense of
one's nationals is still viable.
Sixth, and finally, the traditional concept of sovereignty is
outdated. Sovereignty should include the idea that states have
responsibilities as well as rights. Foremost among these responsibilities is the duty to adhere to minimum standards for
the protection of citizens. If the principle of sovereignty is
modified, states might be less willing to stand by in the face of
grave humanitarian crises.
The values underlying the Charter were originally conceived of as operating in relation to unilateral conduct. The
prospect of multilateral intervention, unlike unilateral action,
presents positive opportunities for responding to the proliferation of intrastate conflict.18 At the same time, there are still
180. See Interview with Edward Luck, supra note 39. Some scholars dispute
the idea that intrastate conflict is in fact on the rise: "Indeed it appears that,
instead of our entering a period of more frequent and more destructive con-
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significant disadvantages to military intervention: The specter
of ideological motivations and self-interest is ever present, as
the intervention in the Dominican Republic more than amply
demonstrates. Yet the risks associated with intervention by
outside states in civil wars significantly decrease as the number
of participants increase; as the study of NATO's actions in Kosovo suggests, the necessity of coordinating the actions of 19
or more countries may diminish tendencies toward rash decision-making. At the same time, the globalization of mass media and communications will continue to make human suffering more real to individuals presently safe from civil war.
Underlying the Secretary-General's statement is an assumption that the international community must be prepared
to move beyond the strict confines of the law as enumerated in
the U.N. Charter. As one commentator put it: "The principles of sovereignty of states and noninterference in their internal affairs . . . cannot constitute a screen behind which torture

and murder may be carried out."1 8 1

In An Agenda for Peace,

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali expressed optimism
for the future role of regional organizations, and argued that
regional organizations should be used for preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and post-conflict peace
building. 182 The situations in Liberia and Sierra Leone especially demonstrate the usefulness of coalitions forged between
regional organizations and member states of the U.N., as conceived in Chapter VIII of the U.N. Charter. The complexities
of these conflicts-where fighting is often occurring between
more than two parties-demonstrate the need for more creative solutions to intrastate conflict.
On September 18, 1998, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 1197, which focused on the need for U.N. support
for regional operations.I8 3 The resolution also called for more
flict, we may, in fact, be leaving such a period. A number of recent studies
have concluded that both the number of conflicts and their levels of devastation have declined markedly since a high point in 1992." d. (citing Ted
Robert Gurr, Ethnic Warfare on the Wane, FOREIGN AFF., May-June 2000, at
52-53).
181. James Chace, The Future is a Foreign Country, THE NEW YoRK TIMES
BOOK REVIEW, July 29, 2001, at 12 (quoting Pope John Paul I).
182. An Agenda for Peace, supra note 4,

64.

183. S.C. Res. 1197, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 3928th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/
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consultation and coordination between the U.N. and OAU,
and between the U.N. and sub-regional organizations in Africa. Yet for regional organizations to be successful, they must
receive broad-based support from the international community. The lesson learned from the study of regional intervention under U.N. auspices in Liberia and Sierra Leone is that
there is much potential for the future effectiveness of such cooperation.
U.N. support also provides an added measure of legitimacy to regional enforcement operations. If the U.N. is kept
abreast of these operations, both before commencement and
for the duration of activity, there is no real reason to fear such
interventions. Furthermore, the existence of effective regional
organizations provides an "out" for the U.N. in times of political stalemate. Another benefit of an approach of coordination
and consultation is added flexibility: "In certain situations,
some parties to a conflict may prefer UN involvement, while
others may prefer that of a regional organization. Thus, cooperation between the UN and regional organizations/arrangements provides opportunities for compromise that can break a
stalemate and provides incentives for conflicting parties to negotiate."18 4 Finally, regional organizations may be more specially qualified to understand and address the root causes of
local conflicts, may have more information regarding the parties involved, and may be better equipped to quickly deploy
troops. 185
On the other hand, it is possible to follow this line of reasoning too far. As one scholar notes: "Keeping control of war
in the modern age means keeping control of this powerful
new rhetoric, making sure that the cause of human rights does
not lure citizens into wars that end up abusing the very rights
they were supposed to defend."'1 6 This type of charge might,
for example, be legitimately leveled at the states intervening in
Kosovo. The International Commission on Intervention and
State Sovereignty, while being sensitive to these concerns, proUNITED
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poses that: "[f]inding a consensus about intervention is not
simply a matter of deciding who should authorize it and when
it is legitimate to undertake. It is also a matter of figuring out
how to do it so that decent objectives are not tarnished by in87
appropriate means." 1
One question posed in the introduction was whether the
principle of non-intervention, as embodied in Article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter, has become a dead letter, and whether the
rule still, or ever, possessed the power to bind states. The only
possible conclusion is that the answer is still pending. Until
the rules regarding aggression become more determinate, 188
state practice regarding military interventions will continue to
vary. In the interim, the challenge is to formulate consistent,
measured, and sufficiently responsive strategies for multilateral intervention that stop short of the use of armed force.
While this process is ongoing, one can only hope that the deci-

sion of states and regional organizations to intervene in civil
wars beyond their own borders will not disturb the current
state of uneasy peace.
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supra note 3, at 5.

188. See THOMAS FRANCK, THE POWVER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 59
(1990) (discussing the costs of indeterminacy of international rules).
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